📑 NEW @ecfr commentary by @EmilyTasinato: European & Gulf Arab states share common interests in #Syria – they should work closely together to ensure a stable transition ecfr.eu/article/all-change-h…

Breaking the strategic Deadlock: A Different Framework for Addressing the Iran Challenge - How can internal change be generated within the Iranian regime? Let it be clear: if anyone could credibly guarantee that a short, contained military operation without regional spillover , would replace Iran’s current regime with a democratic, pro-Western government, I would support it without hesitation. The fall of the Islamic Republic would be a tectonic event in the Middle East — comparable in magnitude to the 1979 revolution itself. It would fundamentally weaken Iran’s regional proxy network, from Hezbollah to the Houthis. It would dramatically reshape the strategic balance of the region. It would open the door to a very different Middle East. But that is not the world we inhabit. There is no credible evidence that limited military action would produce democratic transition in Tehran. There is no organized alternative leadership ready to govern. There is no mechanism by which external force alone can engineer liberal political transformation in a complex, deeply institutionalized system like the Islamic Republic. Wishing for regime change is not a strategy. Assuming it will emerge automatically from escalation is not analysis. In the current strategic environment, it is an aspiration detached from operational reality. And policy built on aspiration rather than probability rarely ends well in the Middle East. So...If we begin with a sober assessment, two realities stand out. First, the Iranian regime cannot be toppled from the air. Precision strikes may damage infrastructure, but they cannot dismantle entrenched political institutions, And it is clear that the current regime would eventually rebuild those strategic capabilities in the absence of an agreement. Second, there is no coherent, organized, and domestically legitimate opposition waiting in the wings. Nor do Gulf states — or U.S. partners — have an interest in Iran collapsing into state failure. A chaotic Iran would be far more dangerous than an adversarial but functioning one. That leaves a more uncomfortable but realistic conclusion: meaningful change in Iran is more likely to come from within the system than from its overthrow - meaning Change Within the System, Not the Collapse of the System Iran’s state institutions are resilient, even if the state itself is economically strained. The Islamic Republic is not fragile in an immediate sense. Its security apparatus is deeply entrenched, and its political elite is adaptive. If change comes, it is likely to be evolutionary — an internal recalibration rather than revolutionary replacement. The key inflection point may be succession. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advanced age creates a structural moment of uncertainty. At the same time, the regime faces a generational legitimacy crisis, particularly among younger Iranians who see limited economic or social opportunity under the current model. Within the system, it seems there are likely figures who understand that the Islamic Republic must “update its operating system” if it is to survive in the long term, including a discussion of the Supreme Leader’s position, with particular emphasis on the question of whether he holds ultimate executive decision-making authority. The Nuclear Deal as a Strategic Leverage The most realistic external lever for influencing internal evolution is the nuclear file — specifically, a structured agreement that both: Blocks Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon through verifiable limits, and Unlocks substantial Western economic investment. A deal structured around these principles would not aim at regime collapse. It would aim at strategic transformation through incentives. Large-scale Western economic integration would gradually alter Iran’s internal balance. Economic opening would empower technocratic and pragmatic factions. It would expose the population, especially younger generations, to global markets and ideas. And it would make it far harder for the leadership to insulate society from the consequences of economic normalization. Yes, in the short term, sanctions relief would strengthen the regime. That is unavoidable. But the alternative — open-ended confrontation or war without a defined political end state — is unlikely to produce regime change either, and far more likely to produce regional escalation. Reducing Structural Dependence on China Allowing Iran to legally export a defined volume of oil beyond China would also shift its geopolitical calculus. Today, Tehran’s economic dependence on Beijing is structural. Diversifying its economic outlets would dilute that dependency and subtly rebalance Iran’s external alignments. From a U.S. strategic perspective, that is not a concession — it is leverage redistribution. Shifting Intentions, Not Just Capabilities Military action can degrade capabilities. It cannot reliably transform intentions. If kinetic tools cannot eliminate Iran’s technical knowledge or missile capacity, then the strategic objective must shift toward influencing decision-making inside the regime. That means empowering those within the system who see engagement with the West as necessary for survival. Such a process would create a degree of Iranian economic interdependence with the United States and Europe. That interdependence would, over time, constrain policy choices and incentivize moderation. It would not eliminate ideological friction. Nor would sanctions disappear entirely; penalties related to regional destabilization or human rights would likely remain. But this would be a strategy of managed evolution rather than forced collapse. No “Silver Bullet” Regime change in Iran is not a “shock and awe” scenario. It is not an event. It is a process. And while engagement carries risks, including short-term regime stabilization — it may still offer a more plausible pathway to long-term transformation than military escalation, which has repeatedly failed to produce sustainable political outcomes in the region. If there is no viable kinetic solution to Iran’s nuclear challenge, then influencing the regime’s trajectory from within may be the only serious strategic alternative that drives from the other problematic solution to the Iranian problem.In a world where there is no clear good option versus bad option and where all the alternatives carry significant drawbacks, each path must be evaluated on its own merits. Is this a viable option? It is far from certain. But what is clear is that the other alternatives are no more feasible and carry with them serious risks to regional stability. #Iran

New🇶🇦🇦🇪: #Qatar’s emir says his “brotherly” meeting with #UAE President MbZ in Abu Dhabi focused on boosting bilateral cooperation and reviewing regional developments, with both sides stressing the need to enhance dialogue and stability. The language is notable. Talk of “regional developments” and “strengthening dialogue” comes as war-risk chatter around #Iran rises, and as tensions simmer between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, making this unscheduled visit more than just protocol.

With the war in Gaza, setbacks in Lebanon, and the fall of Assad all diminishing Iran's strategic depth, could Hezbollah find an unlikely new partner in Turkey? 🇱🇧🇹🇷 Experts @HamidRezaAz, @gonultol, and Michael Young (@BeirutCalling) discuss the future of the group in @amwajmedia's latest debate 👇 🔗amwaj.media/en/debate/debate… #Hezbollah #Turkey #Iran #Syria

سؤال المليون تومان: هل ستستفيد السعودية، من بقاء النظام أم من انهياره؟ مقالتي الجديدة المنشورة الآن #ثمانية thmanyah.com/post/1mpadanhaf…