"As long as U.S. policymakers continue to assess Iran primarily through a Western political lens... not fully account[ing] for [🇮🇷s] ideological legitimacy, revolutionary identity, & deterrence psychology then confrontation becomes less a policy choice and more a matter of time."
Everything ultimately comes back to one central issue: successive U.S. administrations have suffered from a deep conceptual gap in how they understand the Iranian regime.
From the outset, many regional experts argued that Tehran operates with clearly defined red lines — particularly regarding regime survival, strategic deterrence capabilities, and regional influence and that it would not abandon those core interests, even at the risk of military confrontation.
Those warnings were often discounted in favor of the assumption that sufficient economic or military pressure would eventually compel capitulation.
Recent developments should make one thing clear: military escalation is unlikely to force Iran into surrender. On the contrary, external threats tend to reinforce the regime’s internal cohesion and validate its long-standing narrative of resistance.
What makes this moment especially unusual is that both sides arguably prefer an agreement over open conflict. Yet negotiations repeatedly fail not necessarily because the objectives are irreconcilable, but because the perceptual gaps and profound mistrust prevent meaningful compromise.
Washington often views Iran through a Western rationalist framework: the belief that escalating pressure inevitably produces pragmatic concessions.
Tehran, however, interprets sustained pressure as proof of structural hostility, reinforcing its determination to resist.
As long as U.S. policymakers continue to assess Iran primarily through a Western political lens — projecting assumptions about cost-benefit calculations that do not fully account for ideological legitimacy, revolutionary identity, and deterrence psychology then confrontation becomes less a policy choice and more a matter of time.
The core issue is not whether pressure works. It is whether U.S. strategy is grounded in an accurate understanding of how this particular regime defines risk, survival, and victory.